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Abstract
Background:  Strategies adopted by health administrations and directed towards drug cost
control in primary care (PC) can, according to earlier studies, generate tension between health
administrators and healthcare professionals. This study collects and analyzes the opinions of general
practitioners (GPs) regarding current cost control measures as w e l l  a s  t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s  f o r
improving the effectiveness of these measures.
Methods: A qualitative exploratory study was carried out using 11 focus groups composed of GPs
from the Spanish regions of Aragon, Catalonia and the Balearic Islands. A semi-structured guide
was applied in obtaining the GPs' opinions. The transcripts of the dialogues were analyzed by two
investigators who independently considered categorical and thematic content. The results were
supervised by other members of the team, with overall responsibility assigned to the team leader.
Results: GPs are conscious of their public responsibility with respect to pharmaceutical cost, but
highlight the need to spread responsibility for cost control among the different actors of the health
system. They insist on implementing measures to improve the quality of prescriptions, avoiding
mere quantitative evaluations of prescription costs. They also suggest moving towards the self-
management of the pharmaceutical budget by each health centre itself, as a means to design
personalized incentives to improve their outcomes. These proposals need to be considered by the
health administration in order to pre-empt the feelings of injustice, impotence, frustration and lack
of motivation that currently exist among GPs as a result of the implemented measures.
Conclusion: Future investigations should be oriented toward strategies that involve GPs in the
planning and management of drug cost control mechanisms. The proposals in this study may be
considered by the health administration as a means to move toward the rational use of drugs while
avoiding concerns about injustice and feelings of impotence on the part of the GPs, which can lead
to lack of interest in and disaffection with the current measures.
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Background
The economic impact of drug prescription is one of the
principal concerns of health administrations. This is com-
mon to most European countries, where drug expendi-
tures as a proportion of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and of total health expenditure has increased dur-
ing the last 30 years, and is expected to continue rising [1].
In Spain, as an example of a National Health System offer-
ing universal health coverage, prescription drug costs rose
to almost 10 million euros in 2008, which represents a
6.2% increase from the costs in 2007 [2]. This increase is
associated not only with an increase in the prevalence of
chronic illnesses [3,4] but also with the manufacture of
and demand for new and more efficacious drugs, which
are more expensive [5,6].
In the primary care (PC) setting, drug prescriptions repre-
sent the most important capital expenditure, accounting
for half of the total costs of family health services [7] and
10% of a national health system's expenditure [8]. There
is considerable variability between healthcare profession-
als and health centres (HCs) with regard to the profile of
prescription drugs [9,10]. Moreover, the literature indi-
cates that there are ways to improve the efficiency of drug
prescriptions in PC without damaging either the patient
or the quality of the prescriptions [11] and this was cor-
roborated by most doctors in a qualitative study carried
out within the UK National Health Service [12].
To date, the principal strategies adopted by health admin-
istrations have been based on measures that are essen-
tially economic, such as the regulation of drug prices and
commercial margins, the review of public financing for
specialty drugs, and the implementation of financial
incentives to limit costs--e.g. drug budgets or performance
based payments--[1,13,14]. The actual health care envi-
ronment, which is based on the medical freedom of phy-
sicians and the emphasis of healthcare professionals on
the effectiveness of treatment to the detriment of effi-
ciency [15], does not promote the spontaneous develop-
ment of certain activities such as reducing healthcare
resource use or modifying clinical practice [16]. Incentive
schemes may serve to respond to priority objectives of the
health care system, such as the rational use of drugs
[17,18].
In Spain, where the health administration is becoming
increasingly decentralized, the implemented prescribing
incentive schemes vary depending on the regional health
service. They range from direct monetary incentives --
bonuses/sanctions-- for compliance with budgetary con-
straints to greater access to training activities for health-
care professionals who meet the budgetary targets set by
the health administration [11].
These measures can generate conflict between the perspec-
tive of health administrators and the clinical vision of gen-
eral practitioners (GPs) [19], who often lack appropriate
training on health management tools and the rational use
of drugs [20], and who perceive these managerial inter-
ventions as a "top down" approach that can lead to a loss
of clinical freedom and a deterioration of their relation-
ship with patients [21]. Cost containment incentives can
outshine the objective of promoting the rational use of
medications and can influence GPs to prescribe drugs that
are less effective and safe than others [22,23].
The present study collects and analyzes the opinions of PC
physicians regarding current measures of drug cost con-
trol, as well as their proposals for improving the effective-
ness of these measures. Although this study has a
particular significance around the PC structure in Spain,
the pressures on GPs to curb budgetary demands are not
unique to Spain, but exist across a range of healthcare sys-
tems [14].
Qualitative methods are used for this purpose, since it
enables deeper insight into behaviour and attitudes, thus
being particularly valuable in the evaluation of health
management strategies [24-26].
Methods
A qualitative exploratory study was designed using focus
groups in order to obtain information [27]. Eleven focus
groups composed of GPs from the regions of Aragon,
Catalonia and the Balearic Islands met between March
and July 2007. All participants belonged to HCs that had
been selected for a previous study related to the classifica-
tion of health problems and the identification of health
care demand patterns in PC. The participants were invited
to participate by the coordinators of the HCs. Emphasis
was placed on the voluntary nature of participation and
on the independence of the study with respect to the
health administration agencies. A total of 82 GPs and 11
HCs were enrolled in the study. The main characteristics
of the participants are summarized in Table 1. Ethical
approval for this study was granted by the Ethics Commit-
tee of Aragon (CEICA).
The focus group sessions, which took place in the HCs,
were supervised by two researchers from the team, one
acting as moderator and the other as observer. The dura-
tion of the sessions ranged from 45 to 90 minutes. In all
cases, dialogues were recorded with the permission of the
participants and on the understanding that all informa-
tion was confidential. Data for analysis were obtained
from 10 of the 11 transcripts, one being excluded because
it included an insufficient number of participants (only
two persons).BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:209 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/209
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The sessions followed a semi-structured guide based on
two major issues: 1) current strategies of drug resource
allocation and pharmaceutical cost control and 2) patient
classification systems and their implementation in PC. As
a result, opinions of secondary relevance were obtained
from the interviews. This study analyzed this information
in a structured manner, based on two main information-
bearing blocks: 1) GPs' perceptions of current measures of
drug cost control, with a special emphasis on incentives
meant to result in pharmaceutical cost savings, and 2)
proposals for improving this control.
Two investigators independently analyzed the data for cat-
egorical and thematic content, in accordance with the
defined dimensions. The elements that stood out in each
of the transcripts were identified and coded. The text data
were divided into units and subsequently grouped in cat-
egories according to analogue criteria (similarities
between different units) that tend to delimit the possible
connections between them. Atlas.ti 5.0 software was used
as a tool for ordering and coding the data. Data saturation
was considered to have been reached when the informa-
tion began to be redundant. The results were supervised
by different researchers from the team, taking into
account the context of interpretation by the team leader.
Results
The results of this qualitative study are presented as a
function of the two thematic blocks mentioned earlier:
perceptions of GPs regarding current drug cost control
mechanisms and their proposals aimed at improving the
effectiveness of these measures.
Perceptions of the pharmaceutical cost control 
mechanisms
GPs highlight their awareness of their public responsibility
with respect to pharmaceutical costs.
"I believe there is an increasing awareness from the moment
you start talking about public resources, public money, and the
magnitude of the public budget. Let's say this is a new profes-
sional attitude" (G5)
"We are very used to being evaluated, more specifically here,
and this is no longer something out of the ordinary, [...], there
are many factors that go to show it is a good thing, [...], because
we have an important public responsibility with respect to
expenditure" (G5)
"I want to know what I spend the money on [...], resources are
limited and if we use them for one thing, we take them away
from another, I mean... I know my management capacity is
very small but I believe we can all collaborate" (G1)
However, they also express feelings of frustration, impo-
tence and injustice towards the current drug cost control
measures implemented by health administrators. The feel-
ings of frustration and impotence result from the fact that the
Table 1: Characteristics of the focus group participants
Focus group Region Participants; N % female Age range Work experience*
G1 Aragon 7 71% 43-62 25.4 (6.9)
G2 Aragon 5 40% 40-50 22.0 (8.0)
G3 Aragon 8 38% 43-58 25.0 (5.9)
G4 Aragon 9 78% 28-56 13.6 (10.6)
G5 Balearic Islands 14 57% 30-61 17.7 (10.4)
G6 Balearic Islands 7 43% 35-53 21.6 (6.5)
G7 Balearic Islands 8 63% 39-62 23.6 (6.4)
G8 Catalonia 9 78% 28-47 6.8 (3.6)
G9 Catalonia 6 50% 28-55 15.5 (10.8)
G10 Catalonia 7 57% 28-50 6.7 (4.2)
G11 Catalonia 2 100% 34-43 13 (6.0)
*Mean and SD of years worked in primary care; HC = health centre.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:209 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/209
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tools at their disposal are insufficient to control some fac-
tors, including pressure exerted by patients, the pharma-
ceutical industry, and their own colleagues, as well as
prescriptions written by specialists.
"We are under considerable pressure as a result of the advertis-
ing campaigns, the consumer society, and our own work-place,
plus the pressure from the pharmaceutical laboratories. Often,
things are beyond our control" (G7)
The feelings of injustice result from the fact that the greatest
part of the cost control responsibility falls on the PC set-
ting; instead, they feel other health care settings should
share this responsibility more equitably.
"When I do not have 100% overall responsibility for this pre-
scription, I am not to be penalized. If they penalize me, they
should penalize the cardiologist or the gastroenterologist..."
(G1)
This situation creates a lack of motivation and dissatisfac-
tion with the current measures. The GPs feel that they end
up merely dispensing prescriptions and referring patients
to specialist care.
"I am here so that you send me to the dermatologist ... to have
a blood test done ... to get a prescription. And I answer: madam,
they would not have a doctor here, they would have a machine
instead" (G3)
"They should be the ones dispensing the prescriptions; I am tired
of being the secretary of specialist care ." (G2)
They affirm that they find the motivation to work on phar-
macy cost control-related aspects within their own work
teams, in which the role of the coordinator is a key ele-
ment.
" [...] I have been in several health centres [...]. In some of
them, they are much more insistent either because the coordi-
nator pays more attention or because you face up more indica-
tors. And there are others where the topic is never brought up
[...]. It depends a lot on the centre and on the power of stimu-
lation of the coordinator and the team itself" (G6)
At the same time, GPs believe that the current control
mechanisms do not affect their prescription habits. They
proceed according to their own criteria and are conscious
of their principal commitment to the health and safety of
their patients. This attitude is strengthened by their close
relationship and frequent contact with their patients, as
well as by their awareness of the value of follow-up.
"What we do is common sense. They tell me I have to give this
or the other not to be penalized... I find this unacceptable.
Drugs are our working tools. We are physicians and if I believe
that it is the best that I can give, I shall give it" (G4)
"Of course, it is very different for these people (specialists) who
do not get involved [...], who will hopefully see the patient once
every 6 months, but us, who see them every day, we take the
patients very much into account ..." (G6)
The topic of financial incentives gave rise to confrontational
opinions in the focus group sessions. While some physi-
cians said they consider it a source of encouragement, oth-
ers contend that, given that their obligation is to properly
carry out their job with a fair salary as the reward, it is not
ethical for the "savings" to the health system to be directly
connected to the latter in the form of a bonus salary.
"If a part of our income is in the form of economic incentives,
there will be less discouraged physicians. I bet they suddenly
regain the interest towards pharmacy issues." (G7)
"An incentive that goes from the pharmacy saving directly to
the pocket of the physician is disreputable. If people knew of
it..." (G5)
In some geographical areas, such as Catalonia, where GPs
are economically penalized for non-compliance with budg-
etary constraints, the application of these measures has
had very negative results. More specifically, the GPs
describe the system as a de-motivating measure that can
result in deviance in decision-making, thus distancing the
physician from the needs of the patient. In addition, they
criticize the fact that GPs are awarded according to short-
term evaluations, ignoring those whose "savings" are sus-
tained over the long term.
"I do my work well, that is what I do day to day. If the glycae-
mia is 8.3, bad luck. My salary does not have to depend on
whether the patient eats or does not eat according to our sugges-
tions, this is up to him" (G8)
"We must be alert since incentives can become discouraging"
(G6)
In the region of Aragon, where prescribing incentives are
based on greater access to training activities, this measure
is believed to need realignment, since it is precisely those
GPs who are poorly evaluated who have the greatest need
for training. In addition, continuous training is an entitle-
ment for all healthcare professionals and, as such, should
not be considered an award.
"I believe it should be the other way round. The training days
should be given to those who do not reach a certain expenditure
level" (G3)BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:209 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/209
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In general, all of the groups highlighted the need to eval-
uate the quality of drug prescription and the health care they
provide rather than the profits they generate, and empha-
sised on the relationship between the latter and the imple-
mentation of health education activities as part of daily
clinical practice.
"We are not rewarded for doing things well, but for spending
less" (G5)
"We already have a good measure of the pharmacy expenditure
[...]. What we now need is to be able to tell a colleague whether
he has worked enough or not, whether he is able to solve the
problems [...] satisfactorily for him and for the patient. This is
how we would obtain the perfect circle" (G7)
"Why do they talk about pharmacy instead of treatment? [...]
Why isn't the psychological treatment taken into account
together with the prescription of anti-depressants?" (G5)
Proposals for effective drug cost control
The proposals offered in the sessions focused on three
axes involving a) the health administration, b) specialist
care and c) the pharmacy setting.
a) Opinions regarding health administrators' responsibil-
ities
The principal proposed measure was to eliminate from
the list of medications funded by the public administra-
tion drugs whose prescription carries penalties under the
incentive schemes (for example, "new medications"). The
development of cooperative guidelines such as consensus
vademecums, executed as a collaboration between PC and
specialist care, is a possible route for implementing this
control mechanism. GPs also suggested that the databases
of their computer applications be adjusted to limit the
number of drugs listed and to include information on the
retail prices of the medications.
Another aspect of general concern is the need to extend
training not only to PC teams but also to specialist physi-
cians, pharmacologists and citizens accessing PC. GPs
point out that there should be guarantees that these train-
ing activities are totally independent of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, that they are taught by experts, and that they
offer the opportunity to discuss physicians' prescription
practices in a team atmosphere.
"I believe that the specialists need to be trained more [...]. In
this way, we would probably observe a quantitative and quali-
tatively much better evaluation" (G1)
With respect to prescribing incentives linked to the
rational use of drugs, the consensus was that these mech-
anisms should involve time within physician's daily med-
ical practice assigned to professional development and
organization. Incentives must not constitute awards for
performing the job, but must instead be a stimulus to con-
tinue doing their job well. In this sense, they all agree that
there should be an emphasis on promoting spaces for
group discussions oriented towards the improvement of
their clinical competences.
"And we need to be given internal incentives, we need to receive
continuing training, we have to be more content, they have to
resolve the deficiencies so that we can attend the patients, they
have to repair our work-places, we have to be able to prepare our
sessions here, not in our own houses...This is what actually
encourages us" (G6)
In any event, most GPs suggest that incentives need to be
personalized, taking into account the aspects that moti-
vate each of them. To make this possible, some of them
demand the self-management  of the pharmaceutical
budget by each HC itself.
"Let us be self-managed, we would then discuss what motivates
us ourselves, and we would doubtless know how to distribute the
awards" (G5)
"If health centres were private and we were told: here is your
budget [...], pharmacy-related issues would doubtless be our
priority. Why? Because this would enable us to take action over
certain matters on which we cannot act right now, such as spe-
cialist-initiated prescribing, among others" (G5)
Other suggestions that received a high level of agreement
were the need to involve the nurse sector in patients' health
education so as to improve treatment adherence and the
well-known requirement that the time-to-patient ratio of
the consultations be increased.
"They are focusing on drug prescription issues with a massive
power. In contrast, other aspects such as therapeutic aptitudes
etc. are left aside, with absolutely no value placed on other
actors that play a role here...We are not healthcare profession-
als working isolated, so how do they evaluate the weight of the
nursing sector?" (G5)
b) Opinions regarding specialist physicians' responsibili-
ties
All GPs identified their specialist colleagues as being an
important part of drug cost control. The participants
raised two main measures of special relevance in relation
to the rational use of drugs: 1) considering specialist phy-
sicians as potential candidates for continuous training
activities and 2) providing them with a better understand-
ing of drug cost containment measures. Furthermore, asBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:209 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/209
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occurs in PC, their incentive schemes should focus on the
level of fulfilment of the budget containment objectives,
rather than on the interests of the pharmaceutical indus-
try.
" [...] Everybody must be treated in exactly the same way, [...],
working well should be measured equally everywhere" (G8)
c) Opinions regarding the responsibilities of the pharma-
cists
Part of the responsibility for drug cost control falls on the
pharmaceutical setting. In view of the prescription modifi-
cations carried out by pharmacists, GPs consider it neces-
sary that a "strong" policy of regulation be implemented.
They point out that the pharmaceutical setting obtains an
economic benefit as a consequence of prescription modi-
fication, for which the health system should be compen-
sated.
"I believe pharmacists are responsible for always giving the
patient one same drug" (G1)
" [...] As a result, the pharmaceutical setting makes millions of
euros and this is not right. [...]. It is the second element to be
blamed ..." (G8)
A novel suggestion captured in several interviews is that
drug dispensaries be located in the HC, as is the case in
other countries. All GPs strongly believe that this measure
would ensure that only the necessary dose would be dis-
pensed, avoiding the under-usage or wasting of excess
drugs because of inappropriate packaging or changes in
the prescription on the part of the pharmacist.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that, at present, GPs are con-
scious of their public responsibility with respect to phar-
maceutical costs. This result suggests a shift from the
findings highlighted by Denig P et al in the 90's [12], in
which the relative cost of a prescribed drug did not, as yet,
constitute a priority for the healthcare professionals work-
ing in PC. Moreover, the clash between health economics
and clinical freedom observed among clinicians men-
tioned by the late health economist Alan Williams two
decades ago [28] seems to fade away gradually. Neverthe-
less, these changes coexist with the deeply rooted GP's ide-
ological focus on individual patient's needs and the
quality of the given care [19,20,29].
Besides, the current control mechanisms give rise to feel-
ings of impotence and injustice among GPs--mainly
because of factors that are beyond their remit. Accord-
ingly, the results of a study regarding a representative sam-
ple of Spanish GPs indicated that one out of every three
considered their decisions to be conditioned by factors
other than their knowledge and judgment [30]. These fac-
tors include their relationships with patients and the
implication of their colleagues from specialist care.
Regarding patient-related factors, the pressure that they
can occasionally exert in order to obtain medications that
"cure" their health problem has been discussed previously
[20,31]. This problem is aggravated when the amount of
time available to attend to each patient is limited [32].
This pressure can be very difficult to handle because, in
most cases, there is little time to explain the GPs preferred
treatment option to dissenting patients [9].
As for the consequences of specialist-initiated prescrip-
tions, previous research has shown that, after referral, the
cost of medication rises by 23% [33] due to the use of
more innovative and costly drugs [34]. Thus, specialist-
initiated prescribing was strongly criticized by GPs in the
study carried out by Prosser et al [20]. According to the lat-
ter, the effects of this include prescribing expensive formu-
lations and branded drugs, early uptake of new, expensive
drugs, recommending a named drug rather than a class of
drug from which GPs could select a cost-effective alterna-
tive, pharmaceutical industry promotion, cost-shifting
from secondary to primary care and price differentials
between the hospital and community.
Another issue that leads to a lack of motivation among the
GPs is related to the "what" and "how" of drug cost con-
trol. The interviewed physicians believe it necessary to put
a higher value on activities with low marginal output,
such as health education activities, due to their contribu-
tions to better prescription quality. González et al [11], in
their Health Administration Manual, added that other-
wise there is a risk that the GPs will spend their time on
activities with higher marginal output, ignoring the objec-
tives of their work organization. Our results also reveal the
possible misuse and opportunist behaviour that financial
incentives may inspire leading to conflicts of interest
between the physician and the patient, among others
[35]. Moreover, the economic penalties imposed on those
who do not meet the budgetary targets set by the admin-
istration may lead to a potential deterioration of the work
environment due to the tension that could arise among
the PC teams [22].
Under these circumstances, the interviewees suggest sev-
eral measures that, directly and indirectly, can contribute
to a more efficient method of controlling the pharmaceu-
tical budget. In the first place, they consider it essential
that a greater degree of commitment be made both by spe-
cialist care and the pharmacy setting. Not only should
there be a formal plan regulating their prescription habits
through drug cost control mechanisms similar to thoseBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:209 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/209
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implemented in PC, but the "culture" of a more rational
use of drugs should also be promoted in these settings, as
it is also concluded by Prosser et al [20]. Carrying out col-
laborative meetings with specialist care or the develop-
ment of joint drug lists or formularies are some of the
actions taken by prescribing advisers in the UK to improve
prescription management in PC [36].
Second, the GPs insist on the need to be in harmony with
their work-mates through the development of spaces
devoted to sharing insecurities and learning from the
errors of others. This idea has previously been docu-
mented by Caamaño et al [37], who reported that team-
work in PC was associated with better prescription
patterns. In this sense, the Primary Care Organisations
(PCOs) established in England in 1999 could be a refer-
ence framework [38]. Money saved on prescribing costs is
a collective benefit to all practices in the PCO and con-
versely, the penalties for over spending on drugs are only
collective. In theory, GPs within a PCO collaborate for the
greater good of all, acquiring a corporate ethos to accom-
plish health care reform [39].
The importance of the role played by the coordinator of
the HC was also reported in the present study. The coordi-
nator should represent the nexus of healthcare profession-
als and the administration, with the goal of facilitating
participation of the former in the decision-making of the
latter [15]. The willingness of PC physicians to participate
in cost containment decisions, rather than be guided by
administrative rules, was brought to light in a study car-
ried out in four different European health care systems
[40]. In UK, the role of PCO prescribing leads and advisers
in developing cost-based prescribing strategy and incen-
tive schemes is increasingly proactive [41].
With respect to prescribing incentive schemes, the inter-
viewees assert the need for personalized measures adapted
to each HC and physician that take into account their
individual expectations as well as the influence of the
measures on the quality and cost of their prescriptions
[30]. Some of the GPs report that monetary incentives are
not sufficient per se, and that self-management of the
incentives should be the final goal. Nevertheless, a recent
Cochrane review concludes that overall evidence for the
effect of financial incentives, such as drug budgets, is
weak: while drug spending and the volume of drugs pre-
scribed decreases, there is not clear evidence about their
effects on health care utilization (such as referrals to spe-
cialists) [13]. GPs also express the need to be encouraged
by professional incentives (such as time available for
training and research activities and, again, autonomy in
budget management) and work incentives (technical
resources leading to a better working environment in the
HC). A previous report concurs with the concept that a
balanced combination of economic and non-economic
incentives, according to the interests of healthcare profes-
sionals, is more appropriate than the isolated use of finan-
cial incentives [11].
In relation to the rationalization of drug costs through
cutbacks in the breadth of medications that are offered,
the interviewees suggest several possible technical meas-
ures. They suggest exclusion of drugs whose prescriptions
carry penalties according to the incentive scheme. The use
of close-formularies containing a specific list of best-value
drugs was also supported by physicians working in Veter-
ans Affairs health care facilities, although access to non-
formulary drugs and timely approval of requests of
nonformulary medications were strong predictors of clin-
ical satisfaction and support for cost containment meas-
ures [42]. Moreover, close-formularies run the risk of
generating frustration and rejection by the public [43,44]
and outcomes associated to its implementation are not
always positive [45]. Consequently, this type of initiatives
should be preceded by campaigns to increase awareness
regarding the rational use of drugs and provision of infor-
mation that often runs counter to patients' perceptions of
the prescriptions.
Moreover, they support the inclusion of the retail prices
for the drugs in the prescription database of the computer
application. This demand responds to GP's lack of knowl-
edge of actual drug prices, ascertained by Prosser et al [20].
They also assert that GPs rarely monitor costs or view
prices when prescribing, despite having access to prices via
computerized decision-support systems or paper sources
[20].
Finally, the discussion with GPs focused on the impor-
tance of continuous training. The evidence suggests that
educational outreach is among the most effective means
of bringing about change [19,37,46], as long as the train-
ing schemes are derived from sources independent of the
pharmaceutical industry [3,9].
As far as the potential limitations of the study are con-
cerned, the most important one is the study sample, since
GPs were selected on the basis of a quantitative study
mentioned earlier. The use of a theoretical sample would
have allowed for analysis of the influence of variables
related to healthcare professionals or the organizational
structure of the HC. As a result, we consider the present
study as exploratory and its objective as being mainly to
document the presented research questions in the most
complete manner possible.
As far as a generalization of the research ideas is con-
cerned, we believe that the number and the diversity of
individuals in the final sample permit extrapolation of theBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:209 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/209
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results to subjects and contexts that are similar to those in
the present study.
The frequency with which a consensus was reached
among the focus groups supports the assumption that sat-
uration of the information was reached. Nevertheless, the
common elements of the GPs' training, their tendency to
respond according to the phenomenon of social accepta-
bility, their awareness that some expectations can sound
disproportionate, and their link with the PC setting may
limit, only to a certain degree, the sincerity of the
responses and the representiveness of the results.
Conclusion
Principal conclusions of the study were defined by the
participating GPs. They are conscious of their public
responsibility with respect to pharmaceutical costs, but
highlight the need to spread responsibility for cost control
among the different actors of the health system. They
insist on implementing measures to improve the quality
of prescriptions, avoiding mere quantitative evaluations
of prescription costs. They also suggest moving towards
the self-management of the pharmaceutical budget by
each HC itself, as a means to design personalized incen-
tives to improve their outcomes. Finally, it was concluded
that this plan is the only way to pre-empt the feelings of
injustice, impotence, frustration and lack of motivation
that currently exist among GPs as a result of the imple-
mented measures.
These proposals need to be considered by the health
administration as one method of achieving a more
rational use of drugs. Future research should focus on
aspects such as the cognitive mechanisms underlying phy-
sician's behaviour, as studied by Godin et al [47], in order
to incorporate cost considerations into GP decision mak-
ing. The analysis and comparison of the effectiveness of
methods that facilitate the convergence of objectives and
priorities between clinicians and administrators, in terms
of drug cost control mechanisms, is another issue worth
studying [48]. Results of this research work may throw
light on how prescribing support is best delivered and
how implementation strategies are best combined.
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